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NOTES
A contingent weakness of the law, which still persists, is that in the
event of litigation it remains possible that both or neither of the parents
will be granted the exemption. The statutory presumptions provide no
relief since, for trial purposes, these provisions merely govern the level of
proof required of the petitioner, and the burden of producing evidence.
Perhaps the most reasonable solution to the problem lies in making both
parents parties in the same action whenever possible through consolida-
tion and impleader provisions. The effect of this procedure would be to
provide dual benefits of fairness to the parties and an end to multiple
litigation.
MORRIS E. FLATER
STRIKER PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE: AN ANOMALY
One social phenomenon of the twentieth century has been the increas-
ing influence of government largess on almost every phase of human
conduct.' This pervasiveness often results in conflict; the attempt to realize
one political goal inadvertently frustrates the realization of another. The
Food Stamp Act of 1964,2 for example, was recently amended to author-
ize striker participation in the federally funded assistance program for low
income households.3 Those who passed the amendment felt that the legiti-
mate interest of government in providing for needy persons was enhanced
by the legislation. By permitting striker participation, however, Congress
'Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). The article describes the extensive-
ness of government involvement in every aspect of political existence, arguing that conven-
tional property rights are often meaningless because of government largess. The author does
not condemn this, but proposes that new property rights be statutorily created to protect
the individual from the state.
2lhe Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-25 (1970). The program is to aid
low income households in attaining more nutritional diets. It is administered pursuant to a
state plan authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture; state participation is optional.
3The relevant portion of the 1971 Amendment to the Food Stamp Act of 1964 provides
that:
Refusal to work at a plant or site subject to a strike or a lockout for the
duration of such strike or lockout shall not be deemed to be a refusal to
accept employment.
7 U.S.C. § 2014(c) (1970), amending 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (1964).
'House Agricultural Committee, H.R. REP. No. 1402, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6034, 6035 (1970).
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has encroached upon federal labor policy, a policy which furthers the
governmental interest in a healthy economy. Labor theory relies upon
need as an important element of free collective bargaining in the successful
settlement of labor disputes, in that economic need mutivates labor and
management to compromise. The welfare policy which reduces the need
of a striking employee therefore concomitantly reduces the effectiveness
of collective bargaining.
Federal labor policy, enacted under the commerce clause5 grant of
power to the federal government, attempts to promote the free flow of
commerce. 6 Labor disputes interfere with that flow. In the thirties, Con-
gress, convinced that legal intervention could not satisfactorily provide a
solution to the problem,7 proposed in the Wagner Act" to promote collec-
tive bargaining, and thus encourage management and labor to solve their
own problems.
The Wagner Act became law on the floodtide of the belief that the
conflicting interests of management and worker can be adjusted
only by private' negotiation, backed, if necessary, by economic
weapons, without the intervention of law. 9
The legislation reflected a recognition of the inequality between unorgan-
ized labor and management.' 0 It was the purpose of the Wagner Act, and
later the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act),"
to promote a state of equality between labor and management so that
industrial strife could be avoided.'
2
The Supreme Court, in interpreting federal labor policy, has recog-
nized that collective bargaining is the means by which ordered industrial
'The commerce clause provides that Congress shall have the power to regulate com-
merce among the States. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8. As acts of labor affect commerce among
the states, Congress may make rules affecting labor. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
'Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 14 1(b) (1970).
7Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319, 323 (1951).
'National Labor Relations Act, § I, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). The Wagner Act
protects labor's right to engage in concerted activities and imposes on management the duty
to bargain collectively with labor.
9Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319, 322 (1951).
"°National Labor Relations Act, § 1, ch. 372,49 Stat. 449 (1935).
"Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136. The Act re-enacted with amendments and
additions what had been the Wagner Act as Title 1, and added what are now Titles II, 1II,
and IV in an effort to make collective bargaining two-sided. The Act was further amended
by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act),
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519.
1229 U.S.C. §§ 141,151 (1970).
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relations are to be established. 3 In providing for these relations, however,
Congress "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession . . . ,"" and the Supreme Court has consist-
ently prohibited intervention into the substance of collective bargaining
agreements. 5 In H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,6 for example, the Supreme
Court cited approvingly the congressional rejection of such an interpreta-
tion of labor policy:
It must be stressed that the duty to bargain collectively does not
carry with it the duty to reach an agreement, because the essence
of collective bargaining is that either party shall be free to decide
whether proposals made to it are satisfactory. 7
Although the Labor Management Relations Act encourages "prac-
tices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes,"'" the
law appreciates that these disputes are often less than amiable. 9 The Act
permits concerted activities 2' and in particular the right to strike, 21 be-
cause economic pressure on management and labor is part of the collective
bargaining process. "The presence of economic weapons in reserve, and
their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the
'Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959); NLRB v. American Nat'l
Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952); Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 237
(1938); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
1429 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
15H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l
Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co. 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
16397 U.S. 99 (1970). In H.K. Porter Co. management had been found guilty of an
unfair labor practice by the NLRB. In its disposition of the case the Board required manage-
ment to acquiesce to the union's demand. The Supreme Court reversed the NLRB's use of
its sanctioning powers to compel a result.
27397 U.S. at 104, citing S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1935).
1829 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
"See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472, 479 (3d Cir. 1939). The court
gives a brief description of the realities of a peaceful picket.
2Section 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, . . . to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection . ...
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
2rhe Labor Management Relations Act specifically provides the right to strike.
Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein,
shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in
any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications of
that right.
29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970).
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system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized." Thus,
free collective bargaining allows both management23 and labor 24 to induce
through economic pressure what could not be procured through friendly
agreement, so long as the use of economic force does not unduly impair
the right of labor to engage in concerted activities.2
Ideally, the balance between labor and management will lead to in-
dustrial harmony;26 the threat and occasional realization of economic
sanction will temper demands because both parties realize that reasonable
concessions are more profitable than prolonged disagreement. Labor pol-
icy recognizes that collective bargaining does not protect the contestants
from economic adversity;21 indeed, it "leaves the adjustment of industrial
relations to the free play of economic forces but seeks to assure that the
play of those forces be truly free."8 In so doing, the free flow of com-
merce is promoted by economic realities, rather than inconsistent govern-
mental intervention. To the extent that state legislation alters the balance
of economic forces in the collective bargaining process it is void. As the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has said:
The legislation under consideration . . . gives the union a potent
weapon which cannot fail unilaterally to restrict the desired bilat-
2NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477,489 (1960).
=American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
21NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
2'Compare NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) with NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). In Mackay the Supreme Court recognized that
the right to strike does not prevent an employer from hiring employees during a strike, nor
does it compel an employer to discharge those employees at the conclusion of the strike.
The employer is permitted to protect his economic interest even though this may adversely
affect the right to strike. 304 U.S. at 345. In Erie Resistor, however, the court disallowed a
practice by management in which seniority was granted to striker replacements. Although
the practice was not proved to be motivated by forces other than the economic necessities
of retaining new employees, the court reasoned that the infringement on the right to strike
outweighed the employer's legitimate economic interest.
NThe logic of this theory is discussed in Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71
HARv. L. REV. 1401 (1958):
Initially it may be only fear of the economic consequences of disagreement
that turns the parties to facts, reason, a sense of responsibility, a respon-
siveness to government and public opinion, and moral principle; but in
time these forces generate their own compulsions, and negotiating a con-
tract approaches the ideal of informed persuasion.
Id. at 1409. The Supreme Court quotes this argument in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l
Union, 361 U.S. 477,489-90 (1960).
27American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRBv. Insurance Agents'
Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
21Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 183 (1941).
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eral freedom of collective bargaining, left free by Congress for the
operation of economic forces. For the state to intrude into such an
area designed to be kept free is as much a violation of Federal
policy as it is for a state to attempt to regulate rights or duties
specifically protected by the Federal acts.
29
The mere fact that state legislation does not intend to affect federal labor
policy will not excuse its intrusion into the field.3" There are, however, no
corresponding restrictions on federal welfare legislation, as evidenced by
the food stamp amendment authorizing striker participation. 3'
Welfare attitudes have undergone an immense transition in the past
century. At one time welfare was given as a privilege or gratuity to social
outcasts.32 Today welfare benefits approach the legal status of a right,3
arguably because American economic, as well as social, potential is de-
pendent on eliminating poverty.u Because the social and legal attitudes
toward welfare have changed, the expense of providing and administering
public assistance has shifted, in large part from local to federal govern-
ment.3 To the extent states wish to avail themselves of federal money, they
must conform to federal requirements. 36 Thus, though welfare is still ad-
"John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 349 Mass. 390, 208 N.E.2d 516,
524-25 (1965).
".Cf. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
31See note 3 supra.
3See Handler & Goodstein, The Legislative Development of Public Assistance, 1968
Wis. L. REv. 414, 416. The authors trace the prevailing theories of categorical aid to the
poor in Wisconsin, stressing that attitudes toward recipients have changed, but that the
delegation of authority to local governments for distribution of benefits has remained con-
stant.
3Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (the Supreme Court, as a matter of due
process, required a hearing prior to discontinuing welfare).
'lhe Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2701 (1970).
3'The federal government, for example, today pays approximately 100% of the Food
Stamp Program, 7 U.S.C. § 2013 (1970), and 50% of the AFDC program, 42
U.S.C. § 603(a)(5) (1970). In addition, the federal government provides extensive funding
for: low rent housing, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1410-11 (1970); urban renewal, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1452-53 (1970); and the education of low income groups, 20 U.S.C. § 241(a)(c) (1970).
The examples are selected as being characteristic, rather than exhaustive of federal participa-
tion in public welfare. Prior to the 1930's welfare was locally financed. See Handler &
Goodstein, The Legislative Development of Public Assistance, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 414.
"For example, Federal Old Age Assistance, AFDC, Aid to the Blind, and Aid to the
Permanently and Totally Disabled all require the state agency administering the assistance
program to submit a plan for the approval of the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301, 601, 1201, 1351 (1970). All programs have certain standards
which if not met will suspend federal aid. 42 U.S.C. §§ 304, 604, 1204, 1354 (1970). Thus
the prescription of requirements compels the state agency to comply with federal welfare
policy.
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ministered by the state, a federal welfare policy, controlled by grants in
aid to the states,37 is becoming as pervasive as federal labor policy.
Prior to 1968 a striking worker had little access to any welfare bene-
fits. Unemployment compensation was denied in all states except New
York3 and Rhode Island,39 and even there special standards40 were pre-
scribed "to avoid the imputation that a strike may be financed through
unemployment insurance benefits."'" Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC)4 2 was available only when a child had "been deprived
of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from
the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent . . . ."3 Strikers
did not qualify. The Food Stamp Act of 196411 made no provision con-
cerning distribution to strikers, thereby leaving the issue to the discretion
of the states' welfare agencies.
Recent legislation has expanded the scope of welfare programs and,
in doing so, has greatly increased the availability of public assistance to
strikers. A 1968 amendment45 to the AFDC program offers an optional
"Unemployed Fathers" section (AFDC-UF). This section expands the
definition of dependent children to include the child of an unemployed
father who has met certain special requirements. 6 Only twenty-three
3rhe technique of using federal money with restrictions on its use, so as to assure state
acquiescence to federal desire has been found constitutional. See. e.g., Steward Mach. Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
3sN.Y. LABOR LAW § 592 (McKinney 1965).
39R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-16 (1968).
"If unemployment results from a labor dispute in New York, unemployment benefits
are suspended for seven weeks, N.Y. LABOR LAW § 592 (McKinney 1965); and in Rhode
Island for six weeks, R.I GEN. LAWS § 28-44-16 (1968).
"In re Burger, 277 App. Div. 234, 98 N.Y.S.2d 932, 934 (1950), affd mem., 303 N.Y.
654, 101 N.E.2d 763 (1951).
"The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program is designed to encour-
age
the care of dependent children in their own homes . . . and strengthen
family life and to help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capabil-
ity for the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent
with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection. ...
42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970). The assistance is administered by the state, with federal financial
backing contingent upon approval of the state plan by the Secretary of H.E.W. 42
U.S.C. § 602 (1970).
1342 U.S.C. § 606(a)(1) (1970).
"7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-25 (1970).
4542 U.S.C. § 607(a)(2) (1970).
"The special rules under the Unemployed Father section require generally that the
father: (1) has not been employed within the 30 days prior to the receipt of aid; (2) has not
refused a bona fide offer of employment or training for employment within 30 days; (3) has
been employed for a minimum of 18 months within the four years and 3 months prior to
receiving aid or was qualified to receive unemployment compensation within a year of
receiving aid; (4) is registered with the public employment offices in the state; and (5) is not
qualified to receive unemployment compensation. 42 U.S.C. § 607(b) (1970).
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states have elected to participate in A FDC-UF, of which eighteen47 permit
strikers to receive benefits and five"8 do not. Welfare expansion continued
when three years later the Food Stamp Act of 1964 was amended to
prohibit states from denying food stamps to strikers as long as they are
otherwise qualified. 9 This will confer a benefit on the indigent striker in
all states.
These recent amendments appear to reflect a growing social concern
for people in need. When the needy person is a striker, however, the
welfare policy conflicts with the labor policy of free collective bargaining
by upsetting the balance of economic forces. 0 Furthermore, because
A FDC-U F benefits are not administered uniformly with regard to strikers
in different states, longer strikes and uncompetitive wage settlements are
seemingly encouraged in those states which provide greater public aid to
the strikers.5'
The controversy over public assistance to the striker has not escaped
the notice of the judiciary. In two state court litigations" the payment of
welfare benefits to strikers has been found consistent with state welfare
regulations. These cases, however, do not note the frustration of free
collective bargaining. In dealing with the state welfare policy the courts
agreed that legislation should be interpreted so as not to interfere with the
right to strike, which would be the case if public assistance were denied
to the striker. The cases concurred in holding that public assistance is
granted on the basis of need, and that as long as the recipient is deserving
and looking for a job, the courts will not interfere with his right to receive
public assistance solely because he is also on strike.
'4California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Vermont, Washington, and Vest Virginia. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the
Uflited States as Amicus Curiae for rehearing at la, ITT Lamp Div. v. Minter, 435 F.2d
989 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971).
"Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, Oregon, and Utah. Id.
"See note 3 supra.
5See text accompanying notes 2, 3 supra.
"1The G.E. strike of 1969-70 arguably demonstrates that strikers with greater access to
welfare benefits are not as anxious to return to work as are strikers without the benefit of
public assistance. In that strike, workers who lived in New York voted consistently to remain
out on strike; New York provides welfare to strikers. Workers from states other than New
York participating in the same strike voted to returm to work. See New York Times, March
17, 1970 at 42, col. 2.
5 In Strat-O-Seal Mfg. Co. v. Scott, 72 Ill. App. 2d 480, 218 N.E.2d 227 (1966), a
taxpayer brought suit to enjoin the use of state funds for public assistance payments to a
striker, arguing that the striker's standard of living was not the result of "unavoidable
causes" and that the strikers had refused "suitable employment or training." In Lascaris
v. Wyman, 61 Misc. 2d 212, 305 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1969), a county welfare commis-
sioner brought a declaratory judgment action against the Commissioner of the New York
Department of Social Services concerning the rights of striking employees to welfare bene-
fits. Both courts held that an otherwise eligible striker was not precluded from receiving
public assistance. In so holding both courts relied heavily on administrative precedent in
their own states, concluding that the legislature could change such precedent at its will.
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The courts' analyses may be criticized for confusing two principles
which deserve separate treatment. First, if the decisions were based solely
on the need of the otherwise qualified recipient, the opinions would be
sound. But both decisions acknowledge the second principle, the right to
strike. It is submitted, however, that the right to strike carries with it no
right to receive public assistance.53 The right to strike would not have been
impaired had the court denied the strikers the right to welfare. The courts'
language leads to the conclusion that the right to strike would be without
meaning if public assistance were not available, and that therefore the
right to strike carries with it the right to receive public assistance. The
courts appear to read too much into the right to strike.
In ITT Lamp Division v. Minter,54 the legality of a state's administer-
ing public assistance to strikers was recently challenged as a violation of
federal labor policy. It was argued that the federal interest in labor policy
was so substantial that the state was preempted from any activity which
would alter the federal scheme. The plaintiff contended that the giving of
AFDC-UF benefits to strikers gave economic support to them, thereby
disrupting free collective bargaining, and thus impinging upon federal
labor policy.5 The court rejected the argument. It first doubted that public
assistance significantly interfered with federal labor policy and went on
to reason that the state interest in distributing welfare to indigent strikers
was not "so insubstantial compared to the federal interest that Congress
"156must be supposed to have deprived the state of such power ... .
The court in Minter, however, was not oblivious to the fact that a
conflict may well exist between a federal labor policy premised on free
collective bargaining and the extension of public assistance to strikers.
The opinion was carefully limited to saying that federal labor policy has
not so clearly defined free collective bargaining that the judiciary can
define incompatible state activities. Indeed, the court notes that the chal-
lenged state activity was really a federal-state activity because federal
money was so conspicuously involved in the AFDC-UF payments. The
court suggests that to the extent that there is a problem, it is not for the
courts but for Congress as creator of the labor and welfare policies to
resolve.57
2lThat state court litigation has misconstrued the right to strike in respect to the availa-
bility of public assistance is not to conclude that a striker may not have a right to public
assistance under some other theory of law. For example, it may be argued that such a denial
violates the equal protection of the laws clause, U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, or that federal
law confers such a right in the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1970). See
Francis v. Davidson, Civil No. 71-853-K (D. Md. 1971).
"435 F.2d 989 (lst Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971).
-"See text accompanying notes 13-29 supra.
11435 F.2d at 994.
57Id. at 993-94.
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The recent amendment authorizing striker participation in the food
stamp program, enacted after the Minter decision, confirms the court's
opinion that Congress did not clearly intend to protect collective bargain-
ing from the effects of welfare distribution. It must be supposed, therefore,
that Congress either believes that striker participation does not alter the
balance of economic forces in collective bargaining, or alternatively, that
welfare policy is more important than the labor policy. Both explanations
are open to criticism.
First, there can be little doubt that strikers take advantage of welfare
when it is available.- In practice, therefore, the union has an additional
strike fund exactly equal to the cost of public assistance during a strike. 59
It is difficult to believe that Congress can think that public assistance does
not affect labor-management relations when the two are engaged in a
labor dispute. 0
Second, though welfare policy purports to help the needy, in reality it
helps only the -needy who are willing to meet the requirements of the
welfare regulations (e.g., availability for work). Labor policy, therefore,
should not be too severely criticized because of its reliance on brute eco-
nomic realities. Indeed, labor policy is in practice based on the same prem-
ise as welfare in that a person in need will do what is required of him to
support himself. The welfare recipient will be available for a job, and the
striker will make concessions in contract negotiations. It is not altogether
unreasonable, therefore, to presume that were public assistance clearly not
available to the striker, the striker would avoid putting himself in the
position of needing it.
5sFor example, during the General Motors Strike of Sept. 14-Nov. 20, 1970, the State
of Michigan Department of Social Services reported that non-public assistance households







The number of General Motors families participating in the Aid to Dependent Children




Supplement to Petitioner's Brief for rehearing at 72a, 74a, ITT Lamp Div. v. Minter, 435
F.2d 989 (lst Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S-933 (1971).
52James Compton, Assistant to the President of the International Union of Electrical
Workers (I EW), is reported to have said that the thirty million dollars of public aid received
by strikers during the 1969-1970 G.E. strike was ten times greater than the union strike fund.
Gannon, Workers on Public Aid During Walkouts Draw Increasing Criticism, Wall Street
Journal, July 14, 1971 at 1, col. 6.
6But cf. House Agricultural Committee, H.R. REP. No. 1402, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 6034, 6035 (1970).
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It should be noted, however, that the frustration of free collective
bargaining is only disagreeable to the extent that bargaining is relied on
to induce a healthy commercial environment. The wage-price freeze en-
acted on August 15, 1971,61 acknowledged an inherent restriction on the
collective bargaining process; it will be pursued only so long as it produces
favorable results. Though the exact future of labor management relations
is unclear, it appears that a wage-price board will limit wage increases.
62
Presuming that government guidelines become a practice, the theory be-
hind free collective bargaining may be altered to the degree that welfare
distributions to strikers will no longer disrupt federal labor policy.
The rationale behind the free play of economic forces in collective
bargaining has been that economic sanctions coerce reasonable conces-
sions." If wage increases are limited by some supervening authority (e.g.,
wage-price boards) reasonable wage demands are theoretically insured,
and therefore the need for the economic sanctions is reduced. Manage-
ment, however, is not compelled by the wage limitation to negotiate a
settlement at the upper limit. In effect, the free play of economic forces is
permitted to the extent that the supervening authority considers wage
increases reasonable. By authorizing welfare distributions to strikers, the
government acknowledges that it has handicapped labor in negotiations
by placing a limit on what can be negotiated, but reciprocates by aiding
labor in its struggle with management to achieve that reasonable limit.
Arguably free collective bargaining has merely been refined; government
will not permit labor to gouge unreasonable concessions from manage-
ment, nor will it permit management to coerce labor through unconscion-
able economic pressure.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that as government expands the
governed become increasingly dependent on the balances established by
legislation rather than the free play of social or economic forces. It is
submitted that the authorization of striker participation in public assist-
ance frustrated a labor policy which remained primarily dependent on the
free play of economic forces. Subsequent federal initiative, however, has
altered the premise of free collective bargaining so that welfare distribu-
tions may not substantially frustrate labor policy, and in practice may
promote industrial harmony.
FRED W. BATTEN
61Exec. Order No. 11,615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15727 (1971).
62Exec. Order No. 11,627, 36 Fed. Reg. 20139 (1971).
OSee text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
